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NOTES
bailor against the third person; ' while in earlier cases negligence
was imputed in4 2a suit by the bailor " but not when the third party
sued the owner.
It is important to note that liability under the statutes is gauged
in proportion to the consent of the bailor,4" so that an express limitation of the bailment may relieve the bailor from liability and in effect negative the value of the procedural aid provided by the statute.4
It is submitted that the preservation of rights in the bailor given
by the interpretation of Minnesota and New York courts achieves the
purpose of the statute in providing only a limited armor from the
common law for the third person. Mesmerized by the logical appeal
of the "Two Way Rule," the minority courts have unwittingly blessed
the concurrently negligent defendant with an immunity from suit
which by accepted rules of statutory interpretation can not be justified.
Richard L. Healy

EVIDENCE-JURY TRIALS-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE-CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES--JUDICIAL COMMENT THEREON. Perhaps the most heavily criticized factor in the administration of justice,
subject to vicious attack by both laymen and practitioners, is the
trial by jury. Arguments center not upon abolition of this constitutionally established right but upon the obvious defects in its practical
results.
Among the many suggestions for improving this important aspect of
democratic justice is the granting of greater powers to the trial judge,
particularly permitting him to comment upon the weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses. Such a suggestion is neither new
nor untried, but has been a controversial question within our country for nearly 150 years.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

No study of the problem of judicial comment may be adequately
undertaken without a thorough understanding of the political impli40
See Note, 6 A.L.R. 316 (1920) for recent cases illustrating the change
to the modern viewpoint taken by the courts after 1908.
Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484 (1859); Welty v. Indianapolis &

V. Ry., 105 Ind. 55, 4 N.E. 410 (1886).

Premier Motor Co. v. Tilford, 61
Pease v. Montgomery, 11 Me. 582,
4:, Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y.
v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 131
Ct. 1927).
44 Note, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 at 161
12

Ind. App. 164, .111 N.E. 645 (1916);
88 AtI. 973 (1913).
101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929); Stapleton
Misc. 52, 225 N.Y. Supp. 661 (Sup.
(1931).
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cations which ultimately led to the radical departure from the common law judicial prerogatives which allowed judicial comment upon
the weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses. At common
law it was never questioned that this judicial power was an inherent
part of the right to trial by jury.' As the judicial systems of the
American colonies originated from the common law of England the
practice of allowing judicial comment by the presiding judge in jury
trials was naturally assumed.
The political controversies raging in that period following the adoption of our Constitution by the freed colonies were not confined
merely to legislative groups, but, unfortunately, were carried by many
judges into the performance of their judicial offices. Perhaps the most
infamous examples arose from the enforcement by the judiciary of
the. Alien and Sedition Acts' enacted in 1798 by a Federalist-controlled
Congress. The acts were bitterly attacked by Jeffersonian-Republicans
condemning them as unconstitutional. "The courts interpreted and applied the law with extreme partisanship. The selection of juries was
generally in the hands of Federalist officials, and the courts not only
refused to allow the constitutionality of the law to be challenged, but
also deprived the accused of the protection of the provision in the law
which permitted the truth of the alleged libel to be offered as a valid
defense. In their charges to the juries, moreover, the judges repeatedly expounded Federalist political principles and made conviction almost inevitable."' The controversy was further aggravated when President Adams packed the federal courts with loyal Federalist supporters in his famous "midnight session."' It is amazing that, with a change
of political power through the election of President Jefferson, federal
judges were neither censured nor restricted.
Extreme political partisanship was not restrained solely to the Federal judiciary, but similar action on the part of state justices gave rise
to a breach occurring between bench and bar in North Carolina, resulting in the first restriction of judicial powers in 1795. In 1786 the
legislature of the State of North Carolina enacted a measure forbidding loyalists, those supporting the English cause during the Revolutionary War, from bringing suit to recover property which had been
confiscated by the American Revolutionists. The judges of the state
Solarte v. Melville, 7 B. & C. 430, 108 Eng. Rep. 784 (K.B. 1827), 3 BL.
Comm.* 375.
The Alien and Sedition Acts in essence made it illegal for any person to
write, print, or publish "any false, scandalous and malicious writing against
the Government of the United States, Congress or the President with
the intention to defame or to bring into contempt or disrepute". Kelly
and Harbison, The American Constitution 196 (1948).
Id. at 197.
4 The enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts under Justice Samuel
Chase, who proceeded in such a partisan manner, and who spoke so vehemently against the Republicans, resulted in some of his trials becoming
utter and complete travesties upon justice. His conduct further aroused
controversy over the measure. For an excellent illustration see United
States v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,709, at 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800).
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were quite willing to enforce the measure, and, as this had been a
profitable field of litigation for the attorneys, they blamed the judges
for their loss of business.' The attorneys of the state were further
inflamed when the court banished from the state two loyalists who
were attempting to recover their property. An attempted impeachment of the judges failed. The final result of this broiling feud was a
legislative enactment forbidding the judges in their charges to the
jury to express any opinion upon the facts.'
Subsequently, residents of North Carolina, migrating westward,
settled the state of Tennessee, and incorporated within the Tennessee
constitution' a provision similar to the North Carolina legislative enactment. The Tennessee constitution was considered outstanding
among existing state constitutions and, as a result, was adopted by
many later territorial constitutional conventions with little consideration for its specific content.!
It would be erroneous to leave the impression that adoption of the
North Carolina rule through an extension of the Tennessee constitution was not in accord with popular opinion of the times. Many factors, among which were the spasmodic outdistancing of judicial enforcement of law by the rapidly expanding American frontier, and
the unparalleled low quality of the average justice, helped crystalize
the layman's antagonism towards judicial comment.
Thus five factors, historical in nature, but of some present day importance contributed to the departure from the common law rule and
resulted in restrictions being imposed upon the trial judge. These
were: (1) Failure of the judiciary to recognize and exercise the solemnity of their office; (2) Indiscreet exercise of the "spoils system"
in the appointment of state and federal judges; (3) Scarcity of competent legal talent available for judicial positions; (4) The pioneer
spirit prevalent at the time, which enjoyed the excitement of the
Johnson, The Province of The Judge in Jury Trials, 12 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y.
76 (1928).
a Id. at 79.
Tenn. Const. Art. V, § 5 (1786); Same provision today, Tenn. Const.
Art. VI, § 9; Johnson, supra note 5.
As a corallary of this era, it is said that in Massachusetts General Ben
Butler had had a disastrous experience with a certain judge and, being a
member of the Revision Committee of the Legislature avenged himself by
being instrumental in having a restrictive statute adopted which accomplished the result reached in North Carolina.
In Illinois a certain judge would instruct the jury in such a way as to
obtain a verdict, desirable to him, and when a correct bill of exceptions
was presented him he would refuse to sign it and deny he had instructed
the jury as stated. As a consequence of such arbitrary action, leading practitioners of his district went to the legislature for relief, which resulted in
a statute restraining judicial comment. See Cartright, Present But Taking
A Judge in South CaroNo Part, 10 Ill. L. Rev. 537 (1916).
lina felt that "this was a deliberate design on the part of two or three
able criminal lawyers in the Constitutional Convention to prevent verdicts of guilty in criminal cases." Johnson, The Province of The Judge
in Jury Trials, 12 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 76, 81 (1928).
5
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adversary method of trial; and (5) a rise of a democratic spirit accompanied by a reform movement placing broader powers in the
hands of the electorate while removing it from public officials.'
PRESENT CuMMENTARY POWERS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE

The rules governing judicial comment upon questions of fact and
credibility of witnesses may be classified in two broad categories: (1)
those jurisdictions which adhere to the common law concept of the
function and authority of the trial judge to comment upon the weight
of the evidence and credibility of witnesses, exercised with discretion,
while leaving the ultimate determination of the facts to the jury,
and (2) those jurisdictions which, by constitutional provision, statutory enactment, or judicial determination, restrict the presiding trial
judge solely to charges upon questions of law.
Federal courts and a growing minority of states0 which appear to
follow the leadership of federal decisions adhere to the common law
concept of the function and authority of the trial judge. Since its
inception the Federal rule has remained the same, permitting the trial
judge in either civil or criminal cases to express to the jury his
opinion on questions of fact whenever, in his opinion, such will assist the jury in arriving at a just verdict. The rule is well stated in
Simons v. United States." Such right of the trial judge is a right guaranteed every citizen in federal courts as a part of the trial by jury."
The power of the federal judge to comment on the facts may be
exercised regardless of the practice in local state courts, or prohibitory
state constitutional provisions." The judge is never required to express his opinion but may do so at his discretion, assuming the proper
circumstances." His right extends even to the point of stating to the
jury that in his opinion the defendant is guilty of a criminal charge.
D

"°

1

"2

'3

Hoyt, The Judge's Power To Comment on The Testimony in His Charge
To The Jury, 11 Marq. L. Rev. 67 (1927).
Thirteen states now follow the common law rule. They are: Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont. Weissberger, Right To
Comment On Evidence In Federal Courts, 5 Brooklyn L. Rev. 272, 274
(1936). Also, California, Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 19, and New Mexico,
N.M. Stat. § 19-101 (51) (e), (f), 42-115 (1941).
142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891); cf. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288
(1930). In an excellent article by Otis, Comment To The Jury By The
Trial Judge, 21 Ore. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1941) itemized characteristics of the
charge to the jury in common law trials are discussed.
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899), cited with approval
in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930). But for a state
court's reasoning that judicial comment is not an element of trial by jury
see People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 898, 901 (1931).
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426 (1875), subsequently approved in Herron
v. Southern Pacific Company, 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931).
A
Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 1925).
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Such was the case in Horning v. District of Columbia"' where the
court stated that the trial judge still allowed the jury "the technical
right, if it can be called so, to decide against the law and the facts.""
However, the facts of this case were undisputed, and it was upon
this point that a later decision in United States v. Murdock," a case
with disputed facts, was distinguished, the court there holding that a
comment by the trial judge stating that in his belief the defendant
was guilty was improper.
However broad the federal rule may appear to be, it is adequately
surrounded by safeguards to prevent arbitrary and pprejudicial action
by the court. It was early established that an opinion of the trial
judge must be stated as an opinion, not as an instruction of law, and
that the judge must expressly leave the ultimate determination of the
facts to the jury." A duty is placed upon the trial judge who will
comment on the facts to state to the jury in unequivocal terms that
his comment is merely his opinion and that the jury is in no way
bound by such opinion.' Failure to fulfill such duty inevitably results
in prejudicial error.' The judge must confine himself to the record
and the circumstances in the proceedings before the court,' and his
remarks must be dispassionate, not argumentive, and free from advocacy. -2 Furthermore, no patently excessive expression of opinion can
be cured by telling the jury that they are not bound thereby." Where
the line may be drawn between permissive and non-permissive comment can be determined only by the language and a consideration of
the circumstances of each case.'
These judicial expressions have been merely a clarification of the
rule which stood unchanged for nearly 150 years. However, in 1932
the Supreme Court, confronted by an unusual case, Quercia v. United
States," where the defendant had been convicted of a violation of a
narcotics charge, issued its decision which has aroused considerable
discussion by its apparent limitations upon the well-established principle. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the following charge
by the trial court had been upheld: "And now I am going to tell you
.3 254 U.S. 135 (1920). An extreme application of this rule is found in
United States v. Notto, 61 F.2d 781, 783 (2nd Cir. 1932) where an instruction "that on the undisputed evidence this man is guilty and it is
your duty in convict him" was not held to be error.
1 Id. at 139
"
290 U.S. 389 (1933). The majority cited with approval Quercia v. United
States, 289 U.S. 466 (1932), unanimously decided by the same court a
year earlier.
11 Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614 (1894).
11 Schaffer & Co. v. West Tennessee Grain Co., 271 Fed. 820, 826 (6th
Cir. 1921).
-" Fuller v. New York Life Ins. Co., 199 Fed. 897 (3rd Cir. 1912); cf. Anderson v. Avis, 62 Fed. 227 (4th Cir. 1894).
United States v. Breitling, 20 How. 252 (U.S. 1857).
-Rudd v. United States, 173 Fed. 912 (8th Cir. 1909).
-3 Malaga v. United States, 57 F. 2d 822, 828 (1st Cir. 1932).
" Stokes v. United States, 264 Fed. 18 (8th Cir. 1920).
-

289 U.S. 466 (1933).
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what I think of the defendant's testimony. You may have noticed, Mr.
Foreman and Gentlemen, that he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is a rather curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying. Why it should be so, we don't know, but that is the
fact. I think that every single word that man said, except when he
agreed with the Government's testimony, was a lie." 6 Then the trial
judge in an effort to bring his opinion within the established rule
continued: "Now that opinion is an opinion of evidence and is not
binding on you, and if you don't agree with it, it is your duty to find
him not guilty."' The Supreme Court, in reversing the case, stated
that the trial judge's characterization of the manner and testimony of
the defendant was such as would excite a prejudice sufficient to preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence. 8 The
court proceeded further and stated that because of the great influence
which the trial judge has on the jury he must use great care to see
that his expressions of opinion on the evidence are fair and not misleading, and he must studiously avoid deductions and theories not
warranted by the evidence.'
Taking notice of the major argument used by those jurisdictions
defending the limitations placed upon the trial judge, the Supreme
Court recognized that the influence of the trial judge on a jury is
necessarily of great weight, and that even his lightest word might
prove controlling. The late Professor John H. Wigmore in a highly
critical analysis of the Quercia case states that the Supreme Court
was confronted with an extreme case, and, in a moment of indiscretion,
allowed itself to do harm to the federal trial judge's judicial powers. 0
Whatever arguments may rage as to the accuracy of the court's decision in the Quercia case, no question remains but that this decision
has hiad a decided influence not only upon federal courts 1 but also
upon state courts 2 following the federal rule.

26

Quercia v. United States, 62 F. 2d 746, 747 (1st Cir. 1933).

2T

Id. at 748.
Quercia v. United States, supra n. 25, at 472.

30

32

Id. at 470.
9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2551 n. 7 (3rd ed. 1940).
Sullivan v. United States, 178 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States
v. Meltzer, 100 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1938).
People v. Maron, 72 Cal. App. 2d 704, 165 P.2d 483 (1946); Snyder v.
Cearfoss, 190 Md. 161, 57 A.2d 786, 791 (1948); State v. Shetsky, 229
Minn. 569, 40 N.W.2d 339 (1949).
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RESTRICTION

OF COMMENTARY

POWERS

BY

STATES

A majority of the states, either by statutory enactment,'3 constitutional provisions,' or judicial decision" restrict the presiding trial
judge solely to charges upon questions of law. Certain states do permit the trial judge to review the evidence in his instructions.' However, these states do not permit an opinion to be expressed, but
merely allow a marshalling of the evidence so that the jury may better understand its application to the issues." For that reason one may
treat both groups in that class which has abrogated the common law
powers of the trial justice. Further, a diversity of opinion exists
among state jurisdictions as to whether comments on questions of fact
by the trial judge constitute error per se or are merely error to which
exception must be taken and prejudice shown. Aside from this problem little remains in explanation of the restrictive rules.
RESTRICTION OF COMMENTARY POWER IN NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota may well serve as an example of those states completely restricting the trial judge in commentary powers.
"The court in charging the jurors shall instruct only as to the law
of the case."'" So limited by statute, the North Dakota judge stands
in that position occupied by his colleagues in thirty-four other states."
This has been the rule governing trial judges since the origin, of the
state. In Territory v. O'Hare," the first criminal case ever reviewed
by the North Dakota Supreme Court, the court laid out the rule in unequivocal terms, by stating: "Where a trial court assumes to remark
upon the weight of the testimony, or upon testimony affecting the
credibility of witnesses, it is treading upon delicate and dangerous
ground, and cannot be too cautious about revealing its own opinion to
the jury."" The court then concluded its opinion by stating "it be.3

40
4

Ala. Code Ann. § 9507 (1928); Fla. Stat. § 54.17 (1941); Ga. Code Ann.
§4863 (1926); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2132 (Bobbs-Merrill 1949); SmithHurd's Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 110, § 191 (1948); Iowa Code §780.9 and
§ 780.35 (1946); La. Code Prac. § 516 (Dart. 1932); Me. Rev. Stat. c.
100, § 105 (1944); Mass. Gen. Laws c. 231, § 81 (Ter. ed. 1932); Miss.
Code § 1530 (1942); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-180 (1943); N.D. Rev. Code
§ 28-1411 (1943); Ore. Code Ann. § 2-308 (1930); S.D. Code § 33.1317
(1939); Vernon's Tex. Stat. § 271 (Rules of Civil Procedure) (1948).
Ark. Const. Art. VII, § 23; Ariz. Const. Art. VI, § 12; Del. Const. Art. IV,
§ 22; Nev. Const. Art. VI, § 12; Tenn. Const. Art. VI, § 9; S.C. Const.
Art. V, § 26; Wash. Const. Art. IV, § 16.
For a collection of cases see Weissberger, Right To Comment On Evidence
In Federal Courts, 5 Brooklyn L. Rev. 272, 274, n. 10 (1935).
S.D. Code § 33.1317 (1939) where it is stated: "In charging the jury
the court shall instruct as to the law of the case; ifit states the testimony
it must in addition inform the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact... .
For a broad collection of cases see 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, § 1055,
n. 12,13,14,15.
N.D. Rev. Code § 28-1411 (1943).
See supra notes 33,34,35.
1 N.D. 30, 44 N.W. 1003 (1890).
Supra note 40, at 1010.
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hooves this court, as a court of last resort in deciding the first criminal case ever brought before it for review . . . not to allow a prejudicial charge upon the facts . . . to pass unchallenged and thereby
become a precedent. Our duty is, on the contrary . . . to uphold with
a strong hand the safeguards of life and liberty which the law
3
42'
In State v. Barry
throws around all who invoke its protection.
the court squarely stated the opinion that the rule of the common
law permitting judges to instruct juries as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence has never been established in
this state. In early state history the trial judge was permitted to marshall the testimony of the case if he informed the jury that they
were the exclusive judges of all questions of fact," but this statute
was strictly construed to prohibit any comment" and was later repealed.'
CONCLUSION

Welcome or not, there appears to be a discernible trend of professional opinion towards restoring to the trial judges the common law
judicial power which was legislated away during a century and a half
of democratic change. Within the past twenty years, four states have
moved forward on this difficult path.' The American Bar Association
Committee on Trial Practice has recommended that the common law
concept of the function and authority of the trial judge be uniformly
restored in all states, and that restrictive states reform their provisions so that after both counsel have concluded their arguments to the
jury, the trial judge can instruct the jury orally as to the law, advising, analyzing, and summarizing the evidence, commenting upon the
weight and credibility of the evidence as he deems necessary, while
always leaving the final decision on questions of fact to the jury.4'
42

Ibid.

Ua 11 N.D. 428, 92 N.W. 809. (1902).
44
N. D. Comp. Laws § 10863 (1913).
45
Supra note 43 at 817.
'
12 N. D. Rev. Code § 29-2130 (1944) eliminated this portion of the former statute in combining N.D. Comp. Laws §§ 10822, 10863 (1913).
(1) California, by constitutional amendment to Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 19
adopted in 1934, now permits judicial comment upon questions of fact.
An important corollary to this movement was the adoption on the same
date by the people of California of Art. VI, § 26 providing for selection
of judges by a method similar to the Missouri Plan, a program intended to
improve the quality of the members of the bench. For an excellent explanation of the plan see Ford, The Missouri Plan for Selection and Tenure of
Judges, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 444 (1950); (2) Colorado; see Kolkman
v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931); (3) Michigan; see Mich.
Comp. Laws § 768.29 (1948); (4) New Mexico; see N.M. Stat. § 19-101
(51) (e),(f), 42-115 (1941).
48
American Bar Association Committee on Trial Practice, Report of the
Section on Judicial Administration 41 (1938), set out in 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2551a (3d ed. 1940).
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These proposals have° been embodied within the Uniform Code of
Criminal Procedure.
Few seasoned practitioners in state courts have found these suggestions attractive. They have steadfastly argued that the influence of
the judge upon a jury is of such great weight as t0 preclude a true
trial by jury where comment is permitted. To the trial attorney, particularly the criminal practitioner, the prospect of losing his overweighted control of the jury is decidedly unpleasant. It is not surprising that attempts to reform restrictive state legislation have met
with strong opposition from members of the bar.' Yet one may ask,
what is the ability of the common juryman to weigh the mass of
conflicting evidence and properly apply intricate questions of law,
unguided by any other than opposing counsels' biased arguments?'
In the final analysis it would appear that the cause of this departure from the common law rule was due to censurable conduct on the
part of trial judges, professionally incompetent to assume proper responsibility in the conduct of trials, and to opposing counsel, overzealous in demanding their assumed prerogatives which they felt
arose from the adversary system of litigating disputes. If a partial
solution for the improvement of trial by jury lies in a return to the
common law powers of the trial judge, the success of such a return
must necessarily depend upon ever-improving qualities among members of the bench and the bar.
Myron Atkinson, Jr.
LaVern C. Neff.
4

American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, § 325 (1930).
"Charge of Court to jury. (1) The Court shall instruct the jury regarding
the law applicable to the facts of the cause, and may make such comment
on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its
opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause. It shall if
requested inform the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact and, whether requested or not, the Court shall so inform them,
if it comments on the evidence, the testimony or the credibility of any
witnesses."

5
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Levenson, Comment To The Jury By The Trial Judge-A Reply, 21 Ore.
L. Rev. 168 (1942).
In 1896 the North Dakota Supreme Court gave these words of guidance
for the trial counsel. In speaking of the limits to which counsel may extend in their arguments to the jury the court stated: "He is allowed a wide
latitude of speech, and must be protected therein. He has a right to be
heard before the jury upon every question of fact in the case, and in such
decorous manner as his judgment dictates. It is his duty to use all the convincing power of which he has command, and the weapons of wit and
satire and of ridicule are all available to him so long as he keeps within
the record ..
" State v. Pancoast, 5 N.D. 516, 67 N.W. 1052, 1064
(1896). Quacre: Are these words spoken in the promotion of justice?

